The United States is in danger of losing the war in Iraq. The risk of defeat is real, despite the modest military successes described to Congress last month by U.S. General David H. Petraeus. For the war primarily requires a political resolution, not a military one, and in this area even the Bush administration admits that there has been little progress.

The most important question is therefore not when or how the troops will leave Iraq, but what kind of Iraq we hope to leave behind when they do. Iraq will not be the ideal democracy originally envisioned by the Bush administration, but a political settlement is still possible; and in helping the Iraqi people to reach such a settlement, national reconciliation must be our first concern.

The work of reconciliation has been sluggish at best under the government of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Malaki, yet it is the obvious precondition for any meaningful progress. The United States has also failed to help the Iraqis move toward reconciliation: non-sectarian governance; amnesty for former enemies (especially members of Saddams Baath party); and, perhaps most important, a meaningful oil revenue-sharing law that would give all the principals an investment in one state. None of these actions are easy, but all of them are necessary. The disarmament of Iraqs sectarian militias and therefore the peace and stability of the country depend on them.

The United States, accordingly, must admit its failure to help effect reconciliation and ask the world for renewed support. We must undertake the diplomatic offensive called for by the This article appears in October 8 2007.